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Abstract 
I investigate the incentive effects of disability pensions on the labour supply decision. The 
implicit tax rate on further work is included as a forward looking incentive measure in order 
to investigate the effect of disability benefits on disability retirement entry as a special type of 
early retirement. A substantial change of the disability pension legislation caused exogenous 
variation in disability benefits in Germany in 2001 and is used to obtain estimates of 
individual’s responses to financial incentives. Benefit levels appear to have no effect on the 
labour market behaviour. At the same time, there is a sizable and significant disincentive 
effect of implicit taxes on labour market income, indicating that alleviating such disincentives 
would likely increase labour force participation. Since the response to financial incentives 
occurs mainly among those in good health, such a policy might on the other hand imperil the 
aim of providing insurance against a health induced loss of ones working capacity. 
 
JEL classification: I12, J26 
Keywords: Disability pensions, labour force exit 
  1.   Introduction  
Losing the ability to work is one of the most personally disastrous and financially 
costly events in life. The social safety nets of all industrialized countries therefore provide 
insurance against the risk of becoming disabled and provide benefits for those with a limited 
working capacity. In the European Union in 2005, 7.9% of the total expenditures on social 
benefits were spent on disability. The expenditures on disability exceeded those on 
unemployment by about 30% on average (Eurostat, 2008). While being of high importance in 
the prevention of poverty among those who lose their ability to work, these benefits may on 
the other hand serve as an exit route to early retirement  and  encourage individuals to 
withdraw from the labour force early. In many countries in the European Union (e.g. 
Denmark, UK, Belgium and the Netherlands), permanent labour force withdrawal occurs on 
average about two years prior to the earliest age of entitlement for old-age benefits (OECD, 
2009a). Entry into disability retirement may be misused to finance labour force exit before 
old-age benefits are legally availabe and thus regular retirement becomes feasible. 
The previous literature regarding the effect of disability pensions on labour force 
participation led to ambiguous conclusions.
1
1 For a detailed discussion of the literature see Haveman and Wolfe (2000). 
 The earliest analyses such as Parsons (1980a, 
1980b), Leonard (1979), and Slade (1984) estimated the probability of labour force 
participation as a function of the replacement rate and found large elasticities with respect to 
disability benefits. Parsons concluded from his analysis that almost the entire decrease in 
labour force participation during the 1960s and 1970s in the U.S. can be explained by the 
increase in disability pensions. In a second strand of the literature, later contributions used 
instrumental variable estimators to deal with the endogeneity of benefits and wages, such as 
Haveman and Wolfe (1984a), Haveman et al. (1991), Riphahn (1999), and Kreider and 
Riphahn (2000). They find much smaller to almost no response of labour force participation 
1to disability benefits. For example, the elasticity found by Haveman and Wolfe (1984b) was 
about 80% smaller than the first result by Parsons (1980a). In a third approach, variation in 
benefit regulations over time and across regions is used to identify their effect on labour force 
participation (e.g. Gruber, 2000; Campolieti, 2004; Autor and Duggan, 2003). Some studies 
use rejected applicants for disability benefits as a control group (Bound, 1989; Chen and van 
der Klaauw, 2008). Those analyses found responses to disability benefits within the range of 
the first two approaches, yet the results vary greatly with the estimation method. 
I contribute to the literature in two ways: first, the paper takes advantage of a reform 
of disability pensions in Germany in 2001. Eligibility criteria are now stricter than before for 
some population groups, and benefits are substantially lower. The reform led to substantial 
exogenous variation in benefits, and moreover, in benefit accruals from an additional year of 
work during an anticipation period. This exogenous variation can be used to identify to what 
extent financial incentives affect individuals’ labour market behaviour. Second,  forward-
looking incentive measures are introduced, which is common in the general retirement 
literature, but rare in the analysis of disability retirement.  
I find no behavioural response to benefit levels, but a substantial effect of the implicit 
tax on further employment. Responses to financial incentives occur mainly among those in 
relatively good health, while individuals in bad health do not adjust their labour market 
behaviour substantially. The results are robust to the inclusion of different subjective and 
objective health measures and to the application of different distributional assumptions and 
discount rates. 
2.   Institutional Background 
An important advantage of the public retirement system in Germany for the analysis 
of retirement behaviour is that it is almost universal and the most important income source 
for most retirees, with private pensions or company pensions being relatively unimportant. 
2About 80% of the labour force is covered, and the average net replacement rate with respect 
to the last wage is high. It was 61.3% in 2008 (OECD, 2009b). Besides old-age pensions and 
survivor’s pensions, disability benefits are provided that are proportional to the individual’s 
old-age pension entitlements. Individuals are eligible for disability benefits if they meet some 
lenient criteria regarding their employment history and their earnings capacity is reduced for 
health reasons. A medical screening procedure is supposed to limit potential moral hazard 
among the insured population, who may overstate a limitation due to their working 
impairment in order to get access to benefits. The  medical assessment is undertaken by 
insurance doctors, who assess the working capacity based on a physical examination or on 
medical files in case of recent in-patient treatment.  
Until 2001 the program was generous. It distinguished between occupational 
disability and general disability. Benefits for general disability amounted to the individual’s 
full old-age pension entitlements and were granted if an individual was unable to perform any 
regular employment in any occupation on a continuous basis. New retirees received €738 
(~US-$ 1000) in 2000 on average (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2008). Benefits for 
occupational disability amounted to two thirds of full old-age benefits and were granted if an 
individual’s working capacity was less than four hours per day in his or her occupation. 
Additionally, general disability benefits were provided if an occupationally disabled 
individual was “effectively excluded from the labour market”, i.e. the health situation would 
allow for employment in part-time jobs at suitable workplaces, but the individual could not 
find such employment after searching for one year. After one year, occupational disability 
benefits were then upgraded to general disability benefits. 
The Retirement Insurance Reform involved three major modifications: first, it now 
distinguishes between full disability and partial disability instead of occupational and general 
disability. Benefits for the fully disabled can be received if an individual can work less than 
3three hours per day, benefits for the partially disabled are provided for those who are able to 
work less than six hours per day. If individuals can perform part-time work, their ability to do 
so in their own occupation is taken into account only for those who are born before 1960. For 
individuals born later, their work capacity is evaluated independent from their occupation. 
Second, benefits for the partially disabled are significantly lower than the former benefits for 
occupationally disabled: rather than two thirds of the full old-age pension, they amount to 
half the old-age pension now (regardless of whether the retiree was born prior to or after 
1960). And third, benefits for the fully and for the partially disabled are reduced by 10.8% if 
claiming takes place prior to age 60.
2,3
The legal changes were first passed shortly before the parliamentary elections in 
September 1998 at the initiative of the conservative government at the time. Before the new 
regulations took effect, the Socialdemocrats and Greens won the elections and suspended the 
enforcement of the reform until 2001. In December 1998, the new government announced to 
the public that the reform will apply to individuals who enter disability retirement after 
January 1, 2001, yet individuals entering prior to that date will be subject to a grandfathering 
clause and their benefits will remain unchanged. Table 1 illustrates the announcement and 
enforcement of the reform. As discussed later, the timing is important as it resulted in a 
period when anticipated changes in benefit regulations subtsantially altered the implicit tax 
on an additional year of labour market income receipt. 
 
3.   Empirical Approach 
The entry to disability retirement depends on the individual’s decision to apply for 
benefits and on the granting agency’s decision to accept the application. The reform in 2001 
2 Between age 60 and age 63, monthly benefits are gradually increased by 0.3% for every month the retirement 
entry is delayed. The full pension for the fully disabled and half of the pension for the partially disabled is paid, 
if disability entry takes place from age 63 onwards. 
3 When the reform was passed, the concept of “effective exclusion from the labor market” was also abandoned 
at first. However, that legal change was redeemed again before the new law was actually enforced.  
4thus changed two important determinants of disability retirement entry: first, the amount of 
pensions was changed, which will affect the relative attractiveness of disability retirement 
entry compared to continued  labour force participation and therefore the probability of 
applying for benefits. And second, by abandoning the concept of occupational disability, the 
probability of approval given the individual’s health status was lowered for individuals born 
after 1960.
4
The analysis focuses on workers in the age group 45-59. Individuals aged 60 and 
older face several options to retire and thus are subject to a different set of institutional 
regulations. They are likely to differ substantially in their behaviour regarding disability 
retirement, and are therefore excluded.
  Generally, the individual’s decision to apply and the agency’s decision to 
approve an application should be modelled jointly. However, as no data on rejected 
applications are available, this approach is not feasible. I therefore restrict the analysis to 
individuals born before 1960. For them, only the determinants of the application decision 
changed during the reform process while the agency’s decision process remained unaffected. 
By restricting the analysis to potential applicants who - given his or her health status - face a 
constant granting probability, it can be justified to follow a common simplification in the 
literature and to model the entry into disability retirement as an individual decision (cf. 
Parsons 1980a, Haveman et al. 1991, Riphahn 1999, Gruber 2000, Chen and van der Klaauw, 
2008). 
5
4 Besides eligibility criteria, the approval of applications may be influenced by the quality of the screening 
process. The legal definition of disability is discrete, although the health status itself is a continuum. The result 
of the assessment may be influenced by doctors subjective perceptions of the legal definition, and 
misclassifications in both directions may occur particularly among individuals whose health status is close to 
where the line between the disabled and the non-disabled is drawn. However, since the medical screening 
process itself remained unchanged by the reform, the probability of a misclassification of applicants should not 
be affected and thus be constant over time. 
 I assume that individuals are forward looking and 
take into account to what extent  future benefits will change depending on the date of 
retirement entry. The measure I include to capture the incentive effects provided by the 
 
5 For a study investigating the incentive effects resulting from the numerous competing pathways into retirement 
for those aged 60 and older compare Boersch-Supan (2001). 
5reform is the “implicit tax rate” on labour market earnings from a one-year delay in 
retirement, as it has been used before in several studies investigating the timing of entry to 
old-age retirement (e.g. Diamond and Gruber, 1999; Coile and Gruber, 2000; Boersch-Supan 
and Schnabel, 1999). It results from the expected net present value of the stream of expected 
disability benefits depending on the date of retirement: 
 
where DBt(R) is the amount of disability pension paid in t depending on the date of 
entry R, pt is the survival probability until period t, and δ is the discount rate. Individuals who 
are working in t=s and decide to retire in t=s+1 receive disability benefits from t=s+1 until 
disability benefits are converted into regular old-age benefits, which usually happens at age 
60.
6  If they decide to postpone retirement until t=s+2 instead, the period of receipt is 
shortened by one year, but there is no actuarial adjustment of monthly benefits.
7 As a result, 
the net present value of the expected benefit stream decreases, i.e. a delay of retirement entry 
results in a loss of benefits. Normalizing this loss of benefits by wt+1, the expected labour 
income during the period of delay gives the “implicit tax rate” on labour market income 
caused by the disability benefit system: 
 
6 Old-age benefits received from age 60 onwards are not taken into account in the analysis because they depend 
only little on the previous decision when to draw disability benefits. Old-age benefits for a former disability 
retiree  are determined  under the assumption that the disability retiree had continued to pay contributions 
according to his average contributions prior to the occurrence of the disability. The old-age pension of a former 
disability retiree therefore differs from the pension he or she would have been entitled to in case of non-
disability only to the amount by which the individual’s wage growth would have exceeded or undercut the 
average wage growth. 
7 In the context of retirement insurance systems, actuarial fairness usually refers to a situation when the expected 
net present value of benefits is proportional to the lifetime contributions for every individual of a given cohort of 
retirees and independent of the date of retirement entry. That means, if an individual claims benefits  at a 
younger or later age and thus the expected period of receipt is extended or shortened, monthly benefits are 
adjusted in a way that the expected net present value of the entire benefit stream remains constant. 
 
6To test the behavioural response to the incentives set by the disability retirement 
insurance, I estimate transition rates to disability retirement. Exits from disability retirement 
back to the labour force occur rarely,
8
In contrast to the widely used option value model established by Stock and Wise 
(1990), the incentive measure used in this analysis does not result from the comparison of all 
possible remaining retirement dates for an individual, but focuses on the change in benefits 
due to a one-year delay of retirement entry only. I do so for two reasons: first, the outcome of 
an application for disability benefits is uncertain, and the probability of approval depends on 
the health status at the time of the application. While it is plausible to assume that individuals 
have relatively good information about their health status in one year and can form an 
expectation about the disability benefits they will get, it is less convincing to assume that they 
 and disability is interpreted as an absorbing state. In 
each period t the individual can decide whether to enter disability retirement by t+1 or to 
remain in the labour force instead. Only those in the labour force, employed or unemployed, 
can undertake a transition. Observations are censored once the individual enters disability 
retirement. The probability of a transition to disability retirement for individual i in the time 
interval (t, t+1] given individual i did not enter disability retirement before, is estimated by a 
binary logit estimator. The transition rate is estimated as a function of the expected net 
present value of discounted disability benefits drawn from t+1 until the individual age 60, and 
the implicit tax rate on a one-year postponement of retirement entry. Furthermore, taste 
shifter variables have to be included to approximate utility from leisure, such as education, 
age, and health. Adding interaction terms between the financial incentive measures and health 
variables allows to test whether individuals in good health respond stronger to the reform 
than those in bad health.  
8 In 2005, approximately 1.65 million individuals draw either full or partial benefits for the disabled (Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung Bund,  2006a). Within the same year, about 32,000 individuals dropped out of benefit 
receipt because their health impairment was cured (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2006b). This translates 
into an average rate of recovery of less than 2%. 
7can do so for a long time in advance. Second, the most important incentive effects provided 
by the reform should be captured sufficiently by the one-year accrual in benefits, as the only 
“kink” in the tax rates occurs in one specific year for postponement from one year to the next, 
which is due to the specific timing of the reform. We can distinguish three relevant periods: 
Until the end of 1998 (“pre-reform period”), benefits were calculated according to the 
generous old law and individuals expected the institutions not to change in the future, as the 
reform was not yet announced. The net present value of the entire benefit stream will 
decrease with every day the retirement entry is delayed. However, delaying retirement entry 
by several years instead of only one year is expected to result in comparable losses per year 
and should thus result in very similar implicit tax rates on annual labour market income. 
Likewise, from 2000 onwards individuals knew that benefits would be calculated according 
to the new regulations at all possible dates of retirement entry. They were expected to be 
considerably lower than in the pre-reform period and to decrease further with a delay of the 
date of entry. But they again were expected to decrease steadily at a comparable rate. I refer 
to that period as “post-reform period”. It is important to note that, although the reform was 
enforced in January 2001, the post-reform period begins in the year before. Individuals who 
are still in the labour force and thus at risk of entering disability retirement in 2000, cannot 
retire prior to 2001, when the new reagulations already took effect.
9
It is only in 1999 that a non-monotonicity occurs: individuals knew that monthly 
benefits would be calculated according to the old law if retirement entry took place at the 
next possible point in time, i.e. in the year 2000. But they anticipated that relevant benefit 
rules would have changed if they delayed retirement entry to 2001 or later. Hence, they 
expected the net present value of monthly benefits to be high if they entered retirement at the 
next possible date and to drop sharply if they delayed retirement for one more year. 
  
9 The annual structure of the data does not allow to identify the exact day, but only the year of retirement entry. 
8Afterwards, the loss per year of delay does no longer change substantially. I refer to that year 
as “anticipation period”. Table 1 illustrates the time schedule of current and expected future 
eligibility criteria and benefit amounts over time. There are no non-monotonicities in the 
benefit formula during both the pre-reform and the post-reform period, and the non-
monotonic change during the anticipation period is fully captured by the one-year change in 
benefits. The forward-looking incentive measure can therefore be restricted to the implicit tax 
rate on a one-year delay without neglecting relevant incentives of the benefit formula. 
A key issue in the construction of financial incentives estimation is the endogeneity of 
income variables. The main source of variation in benefits and the implicit tax rate over time 
is caused by the reform and thus exogenous, yet the variation in benefits and wages across 
individuals is not. To account for that endogeneity, I follow the approach suggested by 
Gruber (2000). By creating “population cells” by gender, education, and region of residence, 
he calculates average earnings over the life cycle and thereby constructs a hypothetical 
earnings history for each of these population cells. Given these earnings histories, at every 
point in time hypothetical entitlements for disability benefits for retirement in t+1 and t+2 can 
be derived for the population cells and are assigned to every individual belonging to one of 
these cells.  
In the absence of a control group, a major problem may arise from reforms of other 
labour market institutions that coincide with the disability pension reform. Of particular 
importance here are old-age benefits or unemployment benefits. While there were only very 
moderate institutional changes that may have affected the attractiveness and feasibility of 
unemployment benefits during the 1990s, substantial reforms were implemented during the 
period of 2004-2006 (so-called “Hartz-Reforms”). Two major changes were implemented: 
first, the period of entitlement for unemployment benefits was shortened especially for older 
workers in 2006, and second, unemployment compensation payments were substantially 
9reduced in 2005.
10
Furthermore, one might argue that entry into disability insurance may be affected by 
the generosity and accessibility of old-age benefits. There were indeed two major reforms of 
the old-age insurance system, one in 1997 and a second one in 2001 (“Riester-reform”). The 
first one introduced permanent benefit reductions for early retirees. However, it affected 
individuals only from age 60 onwards, while this analysis focuses on workers up to age 59. 
The latter reform is more problematic. It is widely seen as “the end of pension generosity” 
(Boeri et. al., 2002) and thus may have disturbed transitions to pension receipt among the 
whole population. As it coincides with the reform under analysis here, I cannot identify a 
group that is affected by one of both reforms only. A response to a change in disability 
benefit levels may thus partly reflect the fact that the German population expected further 
declines in all social benefit levels after 2001. The estimated effect may thus be slightly 
upward biased and should be interpreted as an upper bound. However, the reform can 
influence the results only in the last two years of the analysis, and a time trend is included 
which further limits the potential bias.  
 These important reforms are likely to change the relative attractiveness of 
different pathways out of the labour force and in turn also the probability of applying for 
disability benefits. Possible anticipation effects should be taken into account, as both changes 
were passed in 2004. I therefore restrict the analysis to individuals entering disability 
retirement at 2003 at the latest, i.e. to individuals who are “at risk” up to the year 2002.  
4.   Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I combine information from two data sets. The first one is the “German 
Socioeconomic Panel” (GSOEP), an annual household survey conducted since 1984. It 
covers a broad range of variables, of special interest for this study is information on 
employment, health and the household context. I use the waves 1995 to 2003. In 2003 
10 For a more detailed description of the reforms and an analysis of the 2006 reform’s effect on unemployment 
claims see Dlugosz et al. (2009). 
10information on more than 11,000 households and 21,000 individuals was available. As 
discussed in the last section, I exclude individuals from age 60 onwards and before age 45. 
Individuals younger than 45 are rarely disabled and have higher rates of recovery than older 
individuals. For them it is not plausible to interpret disability retirement as an absorbing state 
and a pathway into early retirement. These restrictions on age group and time span imply that 
individuals born after 1960 do not enter the sample of analysis as well. I exclude individuals 
who were living in East Germany prior to unification and immigrants who moved to 
Germany after the age of 15, as well as self-employed workers and civil servants, as their 
benefit claims follow different rules. However, the sample is not restricted to the currently 
employed population in order to avoid endogenous sample selection problems. Instead, the 
sample contains all individuals who ever held a job subject to compulsory social security 
contributions regardless of whether they are currently employed or unemployed.  
The dichotomous dependent variable takes the value one in year t, if an individual 
receives disability benefits in t+1, and zero otherwise. Observations are censored after 
retirement entry. Overall, 195 entries to disability retirement are observed, out of 12,530 
person-year-observations for 4,034 individuals. Figure 1 shows the incidence of disability 
retirement over time. The effect of the anticipation of lower benefit levels after the reform is 
clearly visible in 1999: as expected, a sharp increase in disability transitions can be seen, 
suggesting that some individuals brought their retirement entry forward in order to get the 
higher benefits before the reform was going to be inforced. The disability incidence decreases 
again in 2000, when low benefits are expected for all remaining dates of retirement entry 
(2001 and later). However, comparing the frequency of entries to disability retirement for the 
pre-reform period, on the one hand, and the post-reform period, on the other hand, there 
seems to be a general downward trend in the incidence of disability retirement. Yet, there is 
no clear drop. It is questionable, whether the reform had any long-term effect.  
11Explanatory variables drawn from the GSOEP include variables that will be used to 
approximate utility from leisure. Gender, age, and health may influence disutility from work, 
since they may influence the individual’s working ability. Subjective and objective health 
measures are available. As a first objective indicator, we can use mortality: the variable takes 
the value one in year t if the individual died until t+5. Furthermore, dummy variables are 
constructed indicating whether the individual was hospitalized for at least one night in the 
previous year, and whether the individual suffers from an officially acknowledged handicap. 
As a subjective measure, the self-rated health status (ranging from “very good” to “very 
poor”) is used.  
Education and occupation are likely to be correlated with job characteristics. The 
decision to retire is usually taken in a household context, and therefore, I include whether the 
individual is married or living with a partner, and whether children are living in the 
household. If the individual lives with a partner, age, employment status, and health status of 
the partner are controlled for in the model. Regional dummies are used to control for general 
labour market characteristics of the individual’s place of residence, and the analysis controls 
for a general time trend.  
Table 2a reports descriptive statistics for individuals who enter disability retirement 
during the observation period and for individuals who do not. Disability retirement is more 
common for men than women. Individuals in the subsample of retirees are older, have higher 
levels of education, and are less likely to work in service jobs. They are more likely to live 
alone, and if they have a partner, their partner is more often not employed or has a health 
impairment as well. Consistent with the expectations, the most striking differences arise in 
individual’s health status, regardless of whether we look at objective or subjective measures. 
Mortality within the next five years is about three times as high for disability retirees than for 
the rest of the population, and they are more than twice as often hospitalized. While only 15 
12% of the sample without benefit receipt report a poor or very poor health status, the same is 
true for almost 50% of the sample of disability retirees.  
One might argue that the increase in the incidence of disability retirement in 1999 
compared to other years comes along with differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of 
both groups of retirement entrants. Table 2b therefore looks at differences between disability 
retirees who enter retirement from 1999 to 2000 and other retirees. Both sub-samples differ 
significantally in socio-economic characteristics with respect to marital status and 
occupation.  Retirees entering in 1999 are less often married and work more often in 
manufacturing jobs. But, most noticable, they do not differ substantially in their health status. 
However, this  may be partly due to the small number of entries each year.  
The variables drawn from the GSOEP do not include financial variables. GSOEP 
provides information on earnings and income, but not on the individual earnings history prior 
to the first interview, and the provided information on the employment history suffers from 
numerous missing values. Therefore I use a second data set: the “Sample of Insurance 
Accounts 2005” (Versicherungskontenstichprobe 2005 (VSKT(2005)), a random sample of 
insurance accounts that were held by the public retirement insurance in 2005.
11
11 The Sample of Insurance Accounts (FDZ-RV – SUFVSKT2005, referred to as VSKT(2005) in the remainder 
of the text)  was kindly provided by the Research Data Center of the Retirement Insurance 
(Forschungsdatenzentrum der Rentenversicherung, FDZ-RV). 
 Apart from 
some basic information about gender, education, and region of residence, the insurance 
accounts contain the full employment and contribution history of every individual who ever 
held a job subject to compulsory social insurance contributions. For each individual, the 
labour market income, be it wages or unemployment benefits, and social insurance 
contributions are known on a monthly basis from the individual age of 14 until their age in 
2005. The main advantages of these administrative data are that there is no panel attrition, no 
recall bias, and almost no missing values. The contribution histories are averaged out over all 
individuals by education, gender, and region of residence, as suggested by Gruber (2000) to 
13deal with the endogeneity of labour market histories. They are then assigned to the individual 
observations taken from the GSOEP, where the same population groups can be constructed. 
The coefficient of correlation between actual lifetime contributions and averaged lifetime 
contributions by population cells is slightly increasing over the lifetime and amounts to 0.59 
at age 45 and 0.63 at age 59. Based on the contribution history and the benefit formula at a 
given time, the benefit entitlement of an individual conditional on the claiming date t+1 and 
t+2 and the resulting implicit tax rate is calculated.
12 Table 2a shows that disability retirees 
have below average benefit entitlements, but above average losses in case of delayed 
retirement entry. If we look specifically at disability retirees who enter disability retirement 
from 1999 to 2000, their entitlements are substantially, although insignificantly, lower than 
those of other disability retirees. Highly significant differences between disability retirees 
occur  for the  implicit tax rate  on delayed entry. It is more than 1.6 times as high for 
individuals who enter disability retirement in 1999 than for other retirees or non-retirees. 
Table  2c  sheds some further light on that finding. It reports the mean of the financial 
incentive variables over the GSOEP-sample over time. They differ substantially in their 
magnitude during the reform process: while ENPVt+1
5.   Results 
 decreases substantially when the post-
reform period begins, we can see a sharp increase in the tax rate during the anticipation 
period that immediately disappears once the reform is fully implemented. 
Table 3 shows the results of estimation of transition rates for two specifications with 
and without health controls.
13
12 Besides the contribution history and the regulation of the time, expected benefits depend on whether full or 
partial disability benefits are granted and are calculated as a weighted average of both. As I do not have 
information on the individual’s probability to be classified as generally or partially disabled, I use administrative 
aggregate data about the share of beneficiaries who received full or partial pensions in a given year as weights 
(Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2008). Thereby it is assumed implicitly that the probability of getting a 
partial or a full pension is perfectly anticipated by the individuals. The discount rate is assumed to be 3% and 
survival probabilities by age, gender, and year are drawn from official life table data (Statistisches Bundesamt 
(2008a)). 
 Because coefficients have no straight-forward interpretation in 
13 Robustness checks using other health measures are presented later in this section. 
14non-linear models, the table presents the average semi-elasticity of predicted transition 
probabilities for a change in financial covariates. For continuous control variables the average 
marginal effect on the predicted transition probability is calculated, for categorical variables 
the average partial effect. Standard errors clustered among individuals and calculated using 
the bootstrap method. 
 A first important finding is that there is almost no response to the net present value of 
expected benefit levels. The semi-elasticity of the probability of entering retirement is very 
close to zero and insignificant. That is the case although the estimated effect may be slightly 
upward biased due to the “Riester-reform”. This finding matches the results by Riphahn 
(1999) for Germany and Bratberg (1999) for Norway, who both found only small behavioural 
effects of disability benefits. At the same time, responses to the implicit tax rate are reflected 
in the data: we find a significant and sizable semi-elasticity of 2.1 with respect to the implicit 
tax rate, i.e. a decrease in the implicit tax rate on labour market income by 1%-point 
decreases the propensity to enter disability retirement by 2.1%. While benefit levels do not 
seem to influence the retirement decision strongly, there is indeed a significant response to 
forward-looking incentives. 
Specification b) introduces a subjective measure of health. The effect of the health 
status turns out to be highly significant and very large in comparison to the effect of financial 
incentives. Compared to a transition rate to disability retirement of 0.9% for those in very 
good health, the transition rate increases by 2.1%-points (5.9%-points) if the individual states 
to be in poor (very poor) health. The probability of retirement entry is more than two to four 
times as high for those in poor or very poor health than the overall transition rate of 1.6%. 
The important role of health hardly comes as a surprise, as a health-induced reduction of the 
working capacity is a legal requirement to receive disability benefits.  
15Other important socioeconomic characteristics include occupation, with individuals in 
manufacturing occupations facing a substantially increased risk of disability retirement, 
gender, and the household context: While individuals who live alone are more likely to 
become a disability retiree, those with a partner or spouse have an even lower risk of entering 
disability retirement if their partners/spouses are employed or suffer from a health condition 
themselves.  
In a next step, a specification is estimated that includes financial incentives by health 
status separately, in order to test whether the response differs among population groups. Self-
rated health status is reduced to a dummy indicator, taking the value one if a “very poor” or 
“poor” health status is reported, and zero otherwise. Semi-elasticities of labour force exit for 
individuals in good or bad health are presented in Table 4. Again, we find no response to the 
expected benefit level, neither for those in good health nor those in bad health. A behavioural 
effect of the benefit system is found with respect to the tax rate only, and here –  most 
strikingly - for individuals in relatively good health only. This result has to be seen in the 
light of the uncertainty of the approval decision. The better the individual’s health status, the 
less likely an approval of an application for disability benefits should be. A perfectly healthy 
individual without any reduction of his or her working capacity should not respond to the 
implicit tax rate, because claiming disability benefits is not a feasible option for them. If a 
significant effect is found, this implies that the behavioural response of those who are close to 
the distinct border between legally disabled and legally non-disabled must be even higher. An 
important policy implication follows: while a mere cut of benefits appears to be a poor policy 
measure to encourage continued labour force participation, actuarial adjustments of benefits 
which in turn lead to a decrease of the implicit tax rate are much more promising to avoid 
misuse of the disability insurance as an exit route to early retirement.  
16On the other hand, this policy option will also affect the level of insurance against the 
risk of becoming disabled. As expected, the behavioural response of individuals in bad health 
is substantially smaller and also insignificant. This result is much less surprising and reflects 
the fact that labour market income is not feasible for those who have indeed lost their 
capacity to work, and consequently taxes on such income are not relevant for their behaviour. 
To test the robustness of the results, the estimation was repeated for several objective 
and lagged subjective health measures. It is often argued that health impairments may be 
overstated by disability retirees in order to justify the receipt of benefits, i.e. retirement status 
and self-rated health may be jointly determined by unobservables (“justification bias”).
14
14 Compare e.g. Anderson and Burkhauser (1984), Bound (1991), and Kreider (1999). Currie and Madrian 
(1999) provide a detailed survey of the empirical literature. 
 
Table 5 presents the results for five specifications using mortality, hospitalization in the 
previous year, the existence of an officially acknowledged handicap in the current year as 
well as lagged by one year, and the subjective self-rated health status lagged by one year. 
Lagged variables are used to account for potential endogeneity. While the resulting 
elasticities change slightly in their magnitude, the overall pattern remains stable and confirms 
the previous result: the response to benefit levels is virtually zero and insignificant for all 
individuals. We see a sizable response to the implicit tax rate for relatively healthy 
individuals, but the response of individuals in bad health is insignificant and with the 
exception of the health measure “mortality” substantially smaller than for those in good 
health.  Table 6  presents further robustness checks using different discount rates for the 
calculation of the net present value of benefit streams. It was assumed to equal 3% in the 
previous estimations and the analysis is now repeated assuming a discount rate of 2%, 4% 
and 5%. The results are very stable and confirm the previous findings. The last robustness 
check repeats the estimation using different specifications for the distribution of the hazard 
rates. The baseline model used a simple logit estimator, assuming a logistic distribution. The 
17model is now repeated assuming a normal distribution of the hazard rates, which leads to the 
estimation of a probit model. In addition, logit estimators with a time-constant, individual-
specific part of the error term are applied to account for unobserved heterogeneity that may 
lead to biased results in the estimation of hazard rates. I estimated specifications with 
normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity, and with discretely distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity where the distribution of the time-constant part of the error term is estimated 
jointly with the model coefficients.
15
6.   Conclusions 
 Results are shown in Table 7. While changing slightly 
in magnitude, the overall pattern of the result is again very stable and matches previous 
findings. 
A recent reform of the German public disability insurance substantially lowered the 
benefits for individuals who suffer from health impairments and whose earnings capacity is 
reduced. This analysis investigated the behavioural responses to a decrease in benefits. I have 
estimated the probability of entering disability retirement and have considered forward-
looking financial incentive measures as determinants. Administrative data containing very 
detailed information on employment and earnings histories and survey data containing socio-
demographic and health information were combined. The results are robust to different health 
measures, discount rates and distributional assumptions.  
As expected the most important determinant of the claiming of disability appears to 
be the individual’s health status. There is no behavioural response to expected benefit levels 
independent of the individual’s health status. Consequently, a mere cut of benefit levels does 
not appear to be an effective policy measure in order to set incentives for a longer working 
life. On the other hand, the forward-looking incentive measure, the implicit tax rate on further 
work, is significant and of sizable magnitude. This result is in line with most studies 
15 See Heckman and Singer (1984) and for software implementation Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004). 
18investigating old-age retirement, that usually find that it is the further gain in income from 
further work that drives retirement behaviour, rather than the income level itself. This finding 
immediately leads to the conclusion that actuarial adjustments should be incorporated in the 
benefit system.  
However, this policy measure is much more problematic in the context of disability 
pensions than in the context of old-age pensions. While there might be a trade-off between 
labour market income and disability pensions for some individuals whose working capacity is 
reduced but not fully lost yet, others in a very bad health status do not respond to financial 
incentives because labour market income is not feasible. The response to the implicit tax rate 
is substantially smaller and also insignificant for those in bad health than for those in 
relatively good health. They are likely to fall in poverty if actuarial adjustments reduce their 
pensions substantially. If the public retirement insurance does not provide a reasonable 
maintenance for individuals with reduced earnings capacity for health reasons, one of the 
main tasks of the public system of social security is neglected.  
A solution to that trade-off might be found in other relevant institutional regulations. 
Boersch-Supan (2007) shows in a cross-country comparison, that the ease of access to 
benefits is the most important determinant of the up-take rate, particularly the strictness of 
vocational assessments. If the medical screening procedure was further improved, the current 
health situation was reassessed more regularly, disability was strictly assessed without regard 
to an individual’s occupation, and rehabilitation programs or subsidies for the adjustment of 
workplaces were given priority over a generous pension granting policy, access to disability 
pensions could be limited more strictly to those who are not able to respond to financial 
incentives. 
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23Table 2a: Explanatory Variables – Descriptive Statistics 
Non-retirees Disability Retirees




Age 51.01 52.85 0.000
Year 1999.34 1997.90 0.000
Individual is female 53.61% 43.13% 0.000
Education:
higher education (ISCED 4-6) 15.19% 27.29% 0.000
secondary education (ISCED 3) 59.75% 54.96% 0.028
lower education (ISCED 0-2) 25.06% 17.75% 0.000
Occupation:
manufacturing 13.75% 21.37% 0.000
technical 8.79% 5.53% 0.009
service 59.07% 41.98% 0.000
missing/ other 18.38% 31.11% 0.000
Region:
north 18.55% 22.71% 0.017
west 36.35% 39.12% 0.196
south 40.80% 30.34% 0.000
east 4.30% 7.82% 0.000
Partner:
indivdual is married 80.76% 69.66% 0.000
individual is living together with a partner 5.09% 9.35% 0.000
individual has no partner/spouse 14.16% 20.99% 0.000
age of partner/spouse 48.77 50.04 0.038
partner/spouse is emplyoed 73.37% 58.94% 0.000
partners'/spouses' self-rated health status is (very) poor 16.15% 18.12% 0.286
Number of children <16 in household 0.30 0.11 0.000
Health:
mortality: individual died within next five years (t, t+5] 1.29% 3.63% 0.000
individual has an officially acknowledged handicap 9.71% 35.69% 0.000
overnight-stay in hospital last year 9.96% 23.28% 0.000
self-rated health status
very good 6.62% 2.29% 0.000
good 39.33% 18.89% 0.000
satisfying 38.29% 30.73% 0.000
poor 13.44% 31.49% 0.000
very poor 2.31% 16.60% 0.000
Financial Variable:
ENPVt+1 (in 1000 €) 60.79 52.13 0.000
Tax (in %-points) 0.35 0.40 0.000
# of Observations (Person-years) 12041 489
Mean
 
Source: Own calculations using GSOEP (1995-2007) for the mortality index and GSOEP (1995-2003) for all 
other variables. 
24Table 2b: Explanatory Variables – Disability Retirees at the Time of Retirement Entry 
from 1999 to 
2000
at any other time




Age 54.76 53.64 0.132
Individual is female 45.45% 38.27% 0.444
Education:
higher education (ISCED 4-6) 30.30% 30.86% 0.950
secondary education (ISCED 3) 51.52% 50.62% 0.926
lower education (ISCED 0-2) 18.18% 18.52% 0.964
Occupation:
manufacturing 27.27% 13.58% 0.050
technical 3.03% 4.32% 0.735
service 42.42% 33.33% 0.320
missing/ other 27.27% 48.77% 0.024
Region:
north 30.30% 17.90% 0.106
west 30.30% 40.12% 0.293
south 27.27% 36.42% 0.317
east 12.12% 5.56% 0.170
Partner:
indivdual is married 54.55% 76.54% 0.009
individual is living together with a partner 15.15% 4.94% 0.032
individual has no partner/spouse 30.30% 18.52% 0.128
age of partner/spouse 54.43 50.93 0.154
partner/spouse is emplyoed 60.87% 56.06% 0.670
partners'/spouses' self-rated health status is (very) poor 17.39% 18.94% 0.862
Number of children <16 in household 0.18 0.09 0.204
Health:
mortality: individual died within next five years 9.09% 8.02% 0.840
individual has an officially acknowledged handicap 51.52% 43.83% 0.421
overnight-stay in hospital last year 36.36% 30.25% 0.492
self-rated health status
very good 3.03% 3.09% 0.987
good 15.15% 19.75% 0.541
satisfying 15.15% 20.37% 0.493
poor 39.39% 36.42% 0.748
very poor 27.27% 20.37% 0.382
Financial Variable:
ENPVt+1 (in 1000 €) 36.96 44.70 0.218
Tax (in %-points) 0.61 0.37 0.000
# of Observations (Individuals) 33 162
Mean
Disability Retirees Entering Retirement...
 




Table 2c Financial Incentive Variables, Mean over Time (in Euro) 
Yeart ENPVt+1 TAX=








2002 58.25 29.25%  
Notes: 
The mean is calculated over the individuals in the GSOEP sample, after 
the incentive variables from the VSKT(2005) were assigned to them. 
 Source: Own calculation using VSKT(2005) and GSOEP (1995 – 2003). 
26 
Table 3 Estimation Results: Logit-Model 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Transition to Disability Retirement  










w.r.t. ENPVt+1 -0.007 0.577 -0.006 0.602
w.r.t. implicit tax 2.167 0.028 * 2.129 0.036 *
Δ Pred. Transition 
Probability
p-value Δ Pred. Transition 
Probability
p-value
in %-points in %-points
good -0.28 0.45
satisfactory -0.26 0.47
poor 2.13 0.00 **












Self-rated Health Status (Ref.: very good)
Notes: see next page. 
27 
Table 3 - continued  
Effect of Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Δ Pred. Transition 
Probability
p-value Δ Pred. Transition 
Probability
p-value
in %-points in %-points
Sector (Ref.: Manufacturing)
Technical -2.141 0.000 ** -1.939 0.000 **
Service -2.782 0.000 ** -2.421 0.000 **
Other -2.296 0.000 ** -1.931 0.000 **
Education (Ref.: Lower Educ.)
Secondary Education -1.186 0.001 ** -0.854 0.007 **
Higher Education -0.832 0.107 -0.309 0.532
Region (Ref.: North)
West -0.029 0.923 -0.083 0.794
South -0.101 0.713 -0.151 0.608
East -0.063 0.896 -0.459 0.276
Gender (Ref.: Male)
Female -1.730 0.000 ** -1.699 0.001 **
Partner Status (Ref.: Married)
Living with partner 0.744 0.181 0.639 0.225
Living alone 0.920 0.373 0.553 0.470
Partner/spouse is ...
... employed -0.482 0.037 * -0.478 0.046 *
... in bad health
b -0.545 0.017 *
Continuous Variables Marginal Effect 
(multiplied by 100)
p-value Marginal Effect 
(multiplied by 100)
p-value
Year 0.030 0.578 0.000 0.427
Number of Kids <16  -0.597 0.055 ° -0.006 0.053 °
Own Age 0.091 0.447 0.001 0.429














Notes: **, *, ° indicate significance at the 1%-level, 5%-level and 10%-level.  
a
Source: Own calculations using GSOEP(1995-2003) and VSKT(2005). 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Figure 1 Relative Frequency of Entry into Disability Benefit Receipt Over 
Time
 
Notes: Dotted lines represent the upper and lower bound of a 95% confidence interval. 
Source: Own illustration & calculation, GSOEP(1995-2003), unweighted data 
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